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IMPRACTICABILITY &
FRUSTRATION IN A
TIME OF COVID-19

T

By Prof. Michael Van Alstine

HE COVID-19
pandemic has brought
economic devastation
on a scale scarcely
imaginable only a
few months ago. In the process,
it also has undermined the rights
and obligations under innumerable
contracts. Tenants now struggle
to make lease payments and
homeowners to keep current on
mortgage obligations. Businesses
small and large have seen their
revenues evaporate, but grapple
with continuing payments under
long-term loans. And whole
industries—airlines, restaurants,
hotels—are facing an existential
crisis.
As a general proposition, however,
contract liability is strict liability.
That is, a person is obligated to
fulfill contractual promises—to
make rental payments, repay loans,
pay for ordered supplies—“even
if circumstances have made the
contract more burdensome or
less desirable” than anticipated
(as stated by the Maryland Court
of Appeals, quoting the Second
Restatement of Contracts). The
COVID pandemic nonetheless has
brought to the fore two relatively
obscure doctrines of contract
law that may be relevant in such
circumstances: impracticability
of performance and frustration of
purpose.
Essentially flip sides of the same
conceptual coin, these twin
“excuses” proceed from the
same premise: A person is not
liable for breach of contract if an
unforeseeable event fundamentally
undermines the parties’ shared
expectations at the time the
contract was formed.

“Impracticability” applies if the
event is an impediment to a party’s
performance under the contract.
“Frustration” applies if the event
destroys a party’s purpose for
entering into the contract in
the first place. To prevail under
either excuse, the affected party
also must show that it was not at
fault for causing the event and
that the event was not reasonably
foreseeable at the time of contract
formation.
The doctrines are obscure for the
simple reason that they almost
never succeed. Most often, a
claimant fails because a court
concludes that the event in fact
was reasonably foreseeable (or
in other words, that the affected
party assumed the risk that it
would occur). They have reasoned
in this vein that a party should
not be able to escape freely
assumed obligations if it could
have protected itself—through
an appropriate contractual
provision—from the effects of the
foreseeable event.
The COVID-19 pandemic,
however, may be different. For
many recent contracts, courts
quite likely will conclude that the
occurrence of the pandemic was
contrary to the shared expectations
of parties, that the event has had
a fundamental effect on a party’s
performance or purpose under
the contract, and (obviously)
that neither party was at fault for
causing it. And, unusually, the
courts very well may conclude that
the pandemic was not “reasonably”
foreseeable for contracts concluded
before early this year (except for
specialist epidemiologists).
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Even if that is the case, the remedy
may not be all that appealing.
Some parties may well have a right
to cancel contracts for the future.
Otherwise, however, the courts
have substantial discretion to
grant relief “as justice requires”—
and this certainly involves
consideration of the interests
of the other party. Thus, even if
they apply, the excuses likely
will not extinguish, for example,
the obligation of an occupying
tenant to pay accrued rent, or of a
homeowner to become current on
overdue mortgage payments, or of
a restaurant to pay for delivered
supplies.
In any event, the doctrines are
certain to rise from obscurity in
the weeks and months to come.
Indeed, it is quite probable that
notions of “impracticability of
performance” and “frustration of
purpose” will take center stage as
our society continues to grapple
with the economic impacts of the
most significant public health crisis
in modern history. ■
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